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INTRODUCTION

An oil and gas operator (operator) contracted with a drilling company (driller) to drill an oil well in Texas.2 The contract contained
1. JERRY JOE "J.J." KNAUFF, JR. graduated from Texas Tech University in
1997 and received his Juris Doctorate from Texas Wesleyan University in 2001. After
being admitted to the State Bar of Texas, J.J. worked as a briefing attorney for Justice
Tom James of the Fifth District Court of Appeals in Dallas. In 2001, J.J. received the
State Bar-LSD Legal Professionalism Award and was named Fort Worth's "Man of
the Year" in 2002 by the Fort Worth Star-Telegram. J.J. is a shareholder at The Miller
Law Firm and his areas of expertise include construction defect, appellate, oil and gas,
and personal injury litigation. He is admitted to practice before the U.S. District
Court, Northern District of Texas and is a member of the Texas State Bar Association.
2. Note, the arguments and authorities contained in this article are applicable to
all contracts containing valid defense and indemnity language and not just scenarios
in the oil and gas context.
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valid defense and indemnity language providing that the driller would
defend and indemnify the operator and its group, including its subcontractors, from any claims, damages, or suits arising out of the driller's
work. The defense and indemnity clause was also supported by insurance. The operator's subcontractors were not parties to the contract
and had no knowledge of the language contained in the contract.
On January 2, 2009, an employee of the driller was severely injured
in an accident. The employee sued the operator and one of its subcontractors on March 1, 2009. The subcontractor answered the suit
and began defending itself by completing written discovery, hiring experts, and taking numerous depositions. The subcontractor paid for
all of these defense efforts out of its own pocket.
On November 1, 2009, the operator produced copies of its contract
with the driller and the driller's insurance policy. After reviewing
these documents, the subcontractor immediately made a demand for
defense and indemnity and treatment as an additional insured from
the driller and its insurer. The case was settled on December 1, 2009.
The driller's insurer participated in the settlement negotiations and
paid the subcontractor's portion of the settlement. The driller's insurer also paid for the subcontractor's defense from the date of tender
but refused to reimburse the subcontractor for its substantial defense
costs incurred in the eight months before tender.
Insurance companies increasingly contend comprehensive or commercial general liability policies exclude coverage for defense costs
incurred before the insured has provided notice.3 To deny pre-tender
costs, insurance companies in Texas often argue they are not responsible for any costs incurred before notice, they are not responsible for
voluntary payments, and they cite the following cases: E&L Chipping,
Company v. Hanover Insurance Company; Nagel v. Kentucky; and
LaFarge Corporation v. Hartford Casualty Insurance Company.
This article analyzes the impact of PAJ, Inc. v. Hanover Insurance

Company and similar cases on the arguments by insurers to deny prenotice defense costs.4 This article also analyzes decisions in other jurisdictions that support the recovery of pre-tender defense costs.
3. Stephen A. Klein, Insurance Recovery of PrenoticeDefense Costs, 34
INS.

TORTS

&

L.J. 1103 (1999).

4. Compare PAJ, Inc. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 243 S.W.3d 630, 631 (Tex. 2008), with
Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Crocker, 246 S.W.3d 603, 609 (Tex.
2008) (holding that "an insurer's actual knowledge that an additional insured has
been served with process does not establish as a matter of law that the insurer has not
been prejudiced by the additional insured's failure to notify the insurer of the receipt
of process"). See also Pecan Grove Assocs. v. John L. Wortham & Son, No. 01-9801020-CV, 1999 WL 460086, at *3 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] July 8, 1999, pet.
denied) (not designated for publication) (holding insured's failure to provide notice
until months after settlement barred recoupment of pre-tender defense costs and/or
settlement monies paid by insured). The difference between PAJ and Crocker is the
appellant provided late notice of suit in PAJ; whereas, in Crocker, the appellant never
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V. HANOVER INSURANCE COMPANY

On January 11, 2008, the Supreme Court of Texas handed down its
opinion in PAJ, Inc. v. Hanover Insurance Company.5 The PAJ court
was tasked with deciding "whether an insured's failure to timely notify
its insurer of a claim defeats coverage under the policy if the insurer
was not prejudiced by the delay." 6
PAJ was a manufacturer and distributor of jewelry that maintained
a Commercial General Liability (CGL) policy with Hanover Insurance Company.' The CGL policy required PAJ to notify Hanover of
any claim or suit brought against PAJ "as soon as practicable." 8 During the policy period, PAJ received a cease-and-desist demand to stop
marketing a line of jewelry and was sued for copyright infringement.9
PAJ waited four to six months after suit was filed before it notified
Hanover of the lawsuit; Hanover denied coverage due to the failure of
PAJ to provide notice of the lawsuit "as soon as practicable." 10 PAJ
brought suit against Hanover seeking a declaration of its rights under
the CGL policy. In that suit, PAJ stipulated it failed to notify Hanover of the claim "as soon as practicable" and Hanover stipulated it
was not prejudiced by the untimely notice.'1 Both parties moved for
summary judgment on the notice issue based on these undisputed
facts. 2 The trial court granted Hanover's motion holding Hanover
was not required to demonstrate prejudice to avoid coverage under
the policy. 3 The trial court's judgment was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, 14and PAJ filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court
of Texas.
The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the Court of Appeals.' 5 In
doing so, the court determined "[c]onditions are not favored in the
law; thus, when another reasonable reading that would avoid a forfeiture is available, [the court] must construe contract language as a covenant rather than a condition."1 6 It then held "an immaterial breach
does not deprive the insurer of the benefit of the bargain and thus
cannot relieve the insurer of the contractual coverage obligation."' 7
Because timely notice is a covenant, the PAJ court expressly held the
gave notice. See Jenkins v. State and County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 287 S.W.3d 891, 898
(Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2009, pet. denied).
5. PAJ, 243 S.W.3d at 630.
6. Id. at 631.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 631-32.
14. Id. at 632.
15. Id. at 637.
16. Id. at 636.
17. Id. at 631.

Published by Texas A&M Law Scholarship, 2022

3

Texas Wesleyan Law Review, Vol. 16 [2022], Iss. 2, Art. 3

TEXAS WESLEYAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16

failure to timely provide such notice will not defeat coverage absent a
finding of prejudice.18
The PAJ holding abrogated prior precedent that held when a notice
provision is breached, "liability on the claim [is] discharged, and harm
(or lack of it) resulting from the breach [is] immaterial."' 9 The PAJ
decision places Texas in alliance with the national majority position in
regards to providing timely notice of a claim or suit to an insured's
liability insurer.2" Post-PAJ, it is clear the insurer may not refuse to
defend or indemnify the insured unless the delay prejudiced the insurer's rights under the policy."1

III.

PRODIGY COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION V. AGRICULTURAL
EXCESS

&

SURPLUS INSURANCE COMPANY

On the same day it handed down its opinion in PAJ, the Supreme
Court of Texas granted the petition for review in Prodigy Communications, Inc. v. Agricultural Excess & Surplus Insurance Company,22
and accepted a certified question from the Fifth Circuit in XL Specialty Insurance Company v. Financial Industries Corporation.3 On
March 27, 2009, the Supreme Court of Texas delivered its opinion in
both cases.
In Prodigy, the Supreme Court of Texas had to determine:
Whether ... an insurer can deny coverage based on its insured's
alleged failure to comply with a policy provision requiring that notice of a claim be given 'as soon as practicable,' when (1) notice of
the claim was provided before the reporting deadline specified in
the policy; and (2) the insurer was not prejudiced by the delay.24
Prodigy concerned a claims-made-and-reported policy 25 containing a
condition precedent that required the insured to give "notice of a
claim to its insurer 'as soon as practicable ... but in no event later
than ninety (90) days after the expiration of the Policy Period or Dis26
covery Period."'
18. Id. at 636-37.
19. See, e.g., Members Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cutaia, 476 S.W.2d 278, 279 (Tex. 1972).
20. PAJ, 243 S.W.3d at 634 n.3 (counting thirty-eight states, including Texas, as
having adopted a notice-prejudice rule in some form versus only six states and the
District of Columbia identified as adhering to the traditional rule).
21. Id.
22. Prodigy Commc'ns Corp. v. Agric. Excess & Surplus Ins. Co., 288 S.W.3d 374
(Tex. 2009).
23. See J. Price Collins, Ashley E. Frizzell & Omar Galicia, Insurance Law, 61
SMU L. REV. 877, 895 (2008).
24. Prodigy, 288 S.W.3d at 377.
25. See id. at 379 n.7 (discussing the difference between claims-made and claimsmade-and-reported policies).
26. Id. at 375.
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In Prodigy, the insured was served with a suit on June 20, 2002, and
notified its insurer of the suit on June 6, 2003.27 The insurer denied
coverage because notice was not given as soon as practicable. 28 The
insured sued its insurer seeking a declaration that the claim was covered under the policy, and the insurer moved for summary judgment,
which was granted. 2 9 The court of appeals affirmed holding:
(1) Prodigy was required to give notice "as soon as practicable,"
even though the policy allowed notice within ninety days after the
expiration of the discovery period; (2) notice given almost one year
after the filing of the lawsuit against the insured was not "as soon as
practicable" as a matter of law; (3) [the insurer] was not required to
prove that it was prejudiced by Prodigy's late notice; and (4) Insurance Code provisions did not prevent [the insurer] from enforcing
the policy's notice provision.30
The insured filed a petition for review and, based on PAJ, argued to
the Supreme Court of Texas that any breach of duty to give notice "as
soon as practicable" was immaterial and could not defeat coverage
because the insurer was not prejudiced by the failure. 3 ' Conversely,
the insurer argued PAJ was not on point because the policy at issue
unambiguously stated "notice, in writing, as soon as practicable" was a
condition precedent to coverage and timely notice is "always inherent
to, and an essential part of, the bargained-for exchange in a claimsmade policy."' 32 The Supreme Court of Texas disagreed with the insurer and, "[flollowing PAJ, [held] in the absence of prejudice to the
insurer, the insured's '33
alleged failure to comply with the provision does
not defeat coverage.
IV.

FINANCIAL INDUSTRIES CORPORATION V.

INSURANCE

XL

SPECIALTY

COMPANY

Financial Industries Corporation v. XL Specialty Insurance Company34 concerns a traditional 5 claims-made insurance policy.3 6 In XL
27. Id. at 376 (the "Discovery Period" expired on May 31, 2003).
28. Id.

29. Id. at 377.
30. Id.

31. Id. at 377-78.
32. Id. at 378.
33. Id. at 375.

34. Fin. Indus. Corp. v. XL Specialty Ins. Co., 285 S.W.3d 877, 877-78 (Tex. 2009).
35. See E. Tex. Med. Ctr. Reg'l Healthcare Sys. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 575 F.3d
520, 528 (5th Cir. 2009) (noting a "traditional claims-made policy" is one "without a
'clear-cut reporting deadline' for the reporting of claims to the insurer, but with an 'as
soon as practicable' requirement").
36. See Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Willis, 296 F.3d 336, 343 (5th
Cir. 2002) ("The purpose of claims-made policies, unlike occurrence policies, is to
provide exact notice periods that limit liability to a fixed period of time 'after which
an insurer knows it is no longer liable under the policy, and for this reason such reporting requirements are strictly construed."').
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Specialty, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit certified the following question to the Supreme Court of Texas: "Must an
insurer show prejudice to deny payment on a claims-made policy,
when the denial is based upon the insured's breach of the policy's
prompt-notice provision, but the notice is nevertheless given within
the policy's coverage period?" 37 Basing its opinion on the reasoning
set forth in Prodigy and its holding in PAJ,3 8 the Supreme Court answered the certified question in the affirmative. The court then held
"an insurer must show prejudice to deny payment on a claims-made
policy, when the denial is based upon the insured's breach of the policy's prompt-notice provision, but the notice is given within the policy's coverage period."3 9
V.

THE EFFECT OF

PAJ ON

PRE-TENDER COSTS

There is no Texas precedent post-PAJ to determine whether pretender costs are recoverable; however, it is likely the Supreme Court
of Texas will treat such cases the same as those courts where notice is
treated as a covenant.4 ° Therefore, other jurisdictions can provide
guidance in determining responsibility for pre-tender defense costs.
A.

Other state court opinions regardingpre-tender costs

Other state courts have held the prejudice analysis should apply to
the existence of a duty to defend after late notice. Furthermore, these
courts have found the prejudice analysis should also be applied to prenotice/pre-tender defense costs.
Like the PAJ court, in Alcazar v. Hayes, the Tennessee Supreme
Court abandoned its long-standing adherence to the traditional common law approach that notice was a condition precedent to recovery
under an insurance policy regardless of whether prejudice to the insurer was shown.4 1 Instead, the Alcazar court "adopted the modern
trend and held that in order for forfeiture of an insurance policy to
result from an insured's breach of a notice provision, prejudice to the
insurer must be shown. ' 42 The Alcazar court did not address whether
pre-notice costs were recoverable; however, a Tennessee federal dis37. Fin. Indus. Corp., 285 S.W.3d at 877.
38. Id. at 879.
39. Id.
40. Compare Griffin v. Allstate Ins. Co., 29 P.3d 777, 782 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001)
(stating that even in policies where tender is a condition precedent, the insurer must
show actual prejudice before the insured's breach will release the insurer from its duty
to defend), with PAJ, Inc. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 243 S.W.3d 630, 636-37 (Tex. 2008)
(holding that "insured's failure to timely notify its insurer of a claim or suit does not
defeat coverage if the insurer was not prejudiced by the delay").
41. Alcazar v. Hayes, 982 S.W.2d 845, 849, 853 (Tenn. 1998); see also PAJ, 243
S.W.3d at 634 n.3.
42. See Alcazar, 982 S.W.2d at 853.
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trict court, applying the holding in Alcazar, did find that such costs
were recoverable subject to a prejudice analysis.43
As in PAJ, Maryland's Supreme Court treats the duty to notify as a
covenant that, absent a showing of prejudice, does not excuse the insurer from complying with its duty to defend. 4 The Maryland court
concluded "[tihe duty to defend, rationally, should attach at the same
moment the correlative right to control attaches, i.e., . . . when an
insured occurrence happens. If that is when the insurer has a right to
45
exercise control, that is also when its duty to do so should arise.
Based on its analysis, the court held the insurer was liable for the prenotice fees and expenses of the insured.46
In Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Company v. Beville, a Florida
appellate court determined the insurer was liable for pre-tender defense costs because "there is no suggestion that the insured's expenses
(prior to the tender) were unreasonable or in some way prejudiced the
carrier. ' 47 In Rovira v. LaGoDa, Inc., a Louisiana court of appeals
held:
[T]he duty to defend arises when the insurer receives notice of the
litigation. Delayed notice of a claim relieves the insurer of the obligation if it was actually prejudiced by the delay. [The insurer] has
not shown that it was prejudiced by the 20-day lapse between
Rovira's filing of suit and LaGoDa's notice of claim and request for
defense. The attorney's
fees that LaGoDa incurred during this time
4s
are recoverable.
Similarly, another Louisiana court of appeals indicated an insured is
entitled to compensation for the value of the benefit provided by private defense counsel prior to the time the insured made demand upon
the insurer for a defense.4 9 In Costagliola v. Lawyers Title Insurance
Corporation,a New Jersey appellate court determined an insurer must
reimburse all defense costs despite untimely notice, absent a showing
of appreciable prejudice.5" Additionally, the Massachusetts Superior
Court, in Wyman-Gordon Company v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance
Company, rejected the argument that, even without prejudice, an insurer has no duty to reimburse pre-notice defense costs.5 1 Finally, in
43. See Smith & Nephew, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., No. 02-2455 B., 2005 WL 3434819,
at *1, *3 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 12, 2005).
44. Sherwood Brands, Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 698 A.2d 1078,
1084 (Md. 1997); see also PAJ, 243 S.W.3d at 636-37.
45. Sherwood Brands, 698 A.2d at 1083-84.
46. Id. at 1087.
47. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Beville, 825 So. 2d 999, 1004 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2002).
48. Rovira v. LaGoDa, Inc., 551 So. 2d 790, 794-95 (La. Ct. App. 1989).
49. Foote v. Sarafyan, 432 So. 2d 877, 882 (La. Ct. App. 1982).
50. Costagliola v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 560 A.2d 1285, 1289 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Ch. Div. 1988).
51. Wyman-Gordon Co. v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., No. 96-2208A, 2000 WL
34024139, at *6-7 (Mass. Supp. Ct. July 14, 2000).
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Griffin v. Allstate Insurance Company,52 a court of appeals in Washington held an insurer may be responsible for pre-tender defense costs
where the insurer is not prejudiced by the late notice.5 3
B.

Federal court opinions regardingpre-tender costs

Like their state court counterparts, several federal courts have held
the prejudice analysis should apply to pre-notice/pre-tender defense
costs. In Peavey v. MIVANPA, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals,
applying Louisiana law, held in cases where timely notice is not a condition precedent, an insurer must demonstrate it was sufficiently
prejudiced by the insured's late notice.5 4 The Peavey court also concluded that attorney's fees incurred prior to the notice to the insurer
were recoverable where the insurer benefited from and relied on the
attorney's efforts prior to notification.5 5 In TPLC, Inc. v. United NationalInsurance Company, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, applying Pennsylvania law, concluded pre-notice costs were reimbursable
except when the insurer could show prejudice.5 6
Other federal courts have allowed pre-notice costs. For example, a
Massachusetts federal court held Massachusetts law did not exclude
pre-notice costs absent prejudice. 57 A New York federal court held an
insurer was liable for the cost of defense "from the time each case or
claim is brought," not from the time each claim is tendered.5" Further,
in Pennsylvania insurers must reimburse the insured for payments the
insured made before giving notice to the insurer unless the insurer can
prove it was prejudiced because such payments were unnecessary or
too high.59
A federal court in Tennessee has held pre-tender costs are reimbursable unless the insurer can show prejudice.6" In that case, the federal district court stated that Tennessee had "adopted the modern
trend" and no longer treated notice as a condition precedent to coverage.61 The Smith court then held:
In a state where the duty to notify "is merely a covenant that, absent a showing of prejudice, does not excuse the insurer from com52. Griffin v. Allstate Ins. Co., 29 P.3d 777, 777 (cited with approval by Truck Ins.
Exch. v. Vanport Homes, Inc., 58 P.3d 276, 281 n.5 (Wash. 2002)).
53. Id. at 781-82.
54. Peavey Co. v. M/V ANPA, 971 F.2d 1168, 1173 (5th Cir. 1992).
55. Id. at 1178.
56. TPLC, Inc. v. United Nat' Ins. Co., 44 F.3d 1484, 1493 (10th Cir. 1995).
57. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Black & Decker Corp., 383 F. Supp. 2d 200, 207-08
(D. Mass. 2004).
58. Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 713 F. Supp. 694, 697
(S.D.N.Y. 1989).
59. Harrisburg Area Cmty. Coll. v. Pac. Employers Ins. Co., 682 F. Supp. 805,
807-12 (M.D. Pa. 1988).
60. Smith & Nephew, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., No. 02-2455 B., 2005 WL 3434819, at *3
(W.D. Tenn. Dec. 12, 2005).
61. Id. at *1.
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plying with its duty to defend, the logic of such a holding becomes
significantly attenuated, for it creates a time gap between the insurer's right to control the defense and its duty to provide one." If
the Court were to adopt such reasoning, upon the filing of the underlying complaint, the insurer would have a right to control the
defense but no duty to defend until notice was provided... Because
notice is not a condition precedent to coverage absent prejudice...
costs are not per se excluded,
the Court finds that pre-tender notice
62
but subject to prejudice analysis.
Based on its analysis, the Smith court approved the award of reasonable pre-tender fees and expenses.6 3
C. Application
Because of the Supreme Court of Texas's holding in PAJ that notice
provisions are covenants and not conditions precedents, it is likely
Texas courts will apply the PAJ holding to pre-notice defense costs in
the same way the Smith court applied the prejudice analysis from the
Tennessee Supreme Court in Alcazar. Where an insurer cannot establish it was prejudiced by late notice of a claim, all costs, including pretender defense costs, should be recoverable.'
VI.

PRE-PAJ ARGUMENTS

AND CASES SUPPORTING DENIAL OF
PRE-TENDER COSTS

There is no Texas Supreme Court precedents regarding recovery of
pre-tender defense costs and the few Texas court cases that discuss the
issue were decided before PAJ. Insurers often offer two justifications
for denying pre-notice defense costs. The first justification is the duty
to defend does not arise until the insurer receives notice; the second
justification is pre-tender defense costs are excluded under the voluntary payment provisions of the typical policy.6 5
A.

Texas cases regardingpre-tender costs decided before PAJ

The three cases often cited by Texas insurers to deny pre-tender
defense costs are E&L Chipping Company v. Hanover Insurance
Company; Nagel v. Kentucky; and LaFarge Corporation v. Hartford
Casualty Insurance Company. Each of these cases is distinguishable
from a post-PAJ demand for pre-tender defense costs.
62. Id. at *3 (citing Sherwood Brands, Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co.,
698 A.2d 1078, 1084 (Md. 1997)) (citations omitted).
63. Id.
64. See id.

65. See Klein, supra note 3, at 1106.
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In E&L Chipping Company, Inc. v. Hanover Insurance Company,
the Beaumont Court of Appeals treated notice as a condition precedent.6 6 That court found:
An insured generally is not entitled to reimbursement of the defense costs it voluntarily incurred before notifying the insurer of the
suit. Because an insurer's duty to defend is triggered by notice, the
insurer has no duty to reimburse the insured for defense costs incurred before the insured gave the insurer notice of the lawsuit.67
The holding that notice provisions are a condition precedent under
E&L Chipping is no longer good law after the Texas Supreme Court's
holding in PAJ that notice provisions are covenants.6 8
In Nagel v. Kentucky Central Insurance Company, the Austin Court
of Appeals held the doctrine of quantum meruit 69 did not require reimbursement for pre-notice defense costs. 7° Nagel is a correct proposition of law because quantum meruit is an equitable theory of
recovery based on an implied contractual agreement; 71 however,
quantum meruit did not apply because Nagel involved an actual contract.72 Thus, any discussion of pre-notice defense costs in Nagel is
obiter dictum 73 and gives no valid guidance for the recovery of pretender defense costs.
Another oft-cited case is LaFarge Corporationv. Hartford Casualty
Insurance Company, in which the Fifth Circuit, applying Texas law,
held pre-tender costs were per se excluded from recovery where a
"voluntary payment" provision of a policy precluded liability for such
costs. 74

In reaching this conclusion, the court noted an insurer's duty

to defend an action did not attach until notice alleging a potentially
covered claim was tendered to the insurer.7 5 Because there was no
duty on the insurer to defend until notice was provided, the Fifth Circuit reasoned the insurer could not be held liable for defense costs
66. E & L Chipping Co. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 962 S.W.2d 272, 278 (Tex. App.Beaumont 1998, no pet.).
67. Id.

68. See PAJ, Inc. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 243 S.W.3d 630, 636-37 (Tex. 2008).
69. Vortt Exploration Co. v. Chevron U.S.A., 787 S.W.2d 942, 944 (Tex. 1990).
70. Nagel v. Ky. Cent. Ins. Co., 894 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Tex. App.-Austin 1994, writ
denied).
71. See Vortt Exploration,787 S.W.2d at 944 (holding quantum meruit is available
only if no express contract exists).
72. Nagel, 894 S.W.2d at 21-22.
73. See Edwards v. Kaye, 9 S.W.3d 310, 314 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1999, pet. denied) (holding "[d]ictum is an observation or remark made concerning
some rule, principle, or application of law suggested in a particular case, which observation or remark is not necessary to the determination of the case ....

[and] is not

binding as precedent under stare decisis") (citation omitted); see also Nichols v. Catalano, 216 S.W.3d 413, 416 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2006, no pet.); In re Mann, 162
S.W.3d 429, 434 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2005, no pet.).
74. Lafarge Corp. v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 61 F.3d 389, 399 (5th Cir. 1995).
75. Id. at 400; see also Members Ins. Co. v. Branscum, 803 S.W.2d 462, 467 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1991, no writ).
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incurred before the insurer's duty attaches.76 The court rejected the
plaintiff's argument that pre-tender costs were recoverable absent a
showing of prejudice and held prejudice was not required in consideration of pre-tender costs. 77 After PAJ, the LaFarge holding is no
longer good law because PAJ expressly held the failure to provide
timely notice is a covenant, not a condition precedent, and as such will
not defeat coverage absent a finding of prejudice.7 8
B.

Insurer's argument that the duty to defend
does not arise until notice

The first justification insurers use to deny pre-notice defense costs is
that the duty to defend does not arise until the insurer receives notice.
This argument fails to account for the genesis of when the duty attaches and is based on the belief that notice is a condition precedent.
The argument supporting the first justification is "predicated upon
the notion that [the insurer's] defense obligation is circumscribed by
the insured's separate obligation to give notice, although the standard
form insuring agreement does not so provide."7 9 This argument also
"confuse[s] events which give rise to the duty to defend ... and events
which give rise to an insurer's breach of that duty .... The duty to
defend pre-exists any obligation on the part of the insured as to notice
...
[and] arises when the underlying claim is brought and thus preexists the insured's obligation to notify its insurer of th[e] suit."8 0
Moreover, this justification is not responsive to the issue before the
insurer, which is whether the typical CGL policy requires the insurer
to pay for all defense costs of the suit, including pre-notice defense
costs. Finally, this argument is based on the assumption that notice is
a condition precedent to the insurer's obligation to perform. 8 1 As a
result, this argument is no longer valid in Texas because the Supreme
Court of Texas now treats such notice provisions as covenants rather
than conditions.82
76. Lafarge, 61 F.3d at 400.
77. Id. at 400 n.19.
78. See PAJ, Inc. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 243 S.W.3d 630, 636-37 (Tex. 2008).
79. Klein, supra note 3, at 1106; see also PAJ, 243 S.W.3d at 636 ("In the case of an
'occurrence' policy, any notice requirement is subsidiary to the event that triggers
coverage. Courts have not permitted insurance companies to deny coverage on the
basis of untimely notice under an 'occurrence' policy unless the company shows actual
prejudice from the delay." (citing Matador Petroleum Corp. v. St. Paul Surplus Lines
Ins. Co., 174 F.3d 653, 658 (5th Cir. 1999)).
80. See Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Dow Chem. Co., 44 F. Supp. 2d 847, 857
(E.D. Mich. 1997); see also Smith & Nephew, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., No. 02-2455 B.,
2005 WL 3434819, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 12, 2005).
81. See Lafarge, 61 F.3d at 399-400; see also Klein, supra note 3, at 1106.
82. See PAJ, 243 S.W.3d at 636-37.
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Insurer's argument that pre-tender costs are voluntary payments

The second justification insurers use to deny pre-notice defense
costs is that such costs are excluded under the voluntary payment provisions of the typical policy. The second justification, however,
neither applies to defense costs nor withstands the required prejudice
analysis.
The typical voluntary payments policy provision, when "properly
construed, does not apply to defense costs at all; rather, the provision
is directed toward settlements to which the insurer has not consented." 3 As noted by the Maryland Supreme Court:
The relevant question as to pre-notice expenses, to be tested against
the covenant not to incur unconsented to expenses, is whether the
insurer has been prejudiced [;] ...was it reasonable, under the circumstances, for the insured to have incurred the expense; was the
expense reasonable; did the expense materially exceed that which
the insurer would likely
have incurred in any event had the notice
84
been given earlier?
In situations where the insurer pays for post-tender expenses and fees,
the insurer will be hard-pressed to argue the costs are unreasonable.
Furthermore, the insurer will have a difficult time arguing it was
prejudiced by reasonable expenses incurred by the insured prior to
tender when the insurer relies on the defense that was provided. 5
D. Application
Even though PAJ and its progeny are silent with regard to the obligation for pre-tender costs, the logical conclusion from the holdings is
that pre-tender defense costs are also subject to a prejudice analysis.
This is because the Supreme Court of Texas concluded notice is a covenant to coverage. 6 Such treatment is important because a party's
breach of a covenant excuses the non-breaching party's performance
only when the breach is material to the contract as a whole. 7 On the
other hand, breach of a condition precedent excuses performance altogether. 8 With PAJ, Prodigy, and XL Specialty, the Supreme Court
of Texas abrogated prior Texas precedents holding notice provisions
are conditions that excuse performance irrespective of prejudice. As a
result, an insurer's reliance upon E&L Chipping Company v. Hanover
Insurance Company; Nagel v. Kentucky; and LaFarge Corporation v.
Hartford Casualty Insurance Company is no longer legitimate.
83. Klein, supra note 3, at 1106.
84. Sherwood Brands, Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 698 A.2d 1078,
1086 (Md. 1997).
85. Peavey Co. v. MV ANPA, 971 F.3d 1168, 1173 (5th Cir. 1992).
86. See PAJ, 243 S.W.3d at 636.
87. See Hernandez v. Gulf Group Lloyds, 875 S.W.2d 691, 692 (Tex. 1994).
88. Hohenberg Bros. Co. v. George E. Gibbons & Co., 537 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Tex.
1976).
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CONCLUSION

Although the Supreme Court of Texas did not specifically answer
the question of whether pre-tender defense costs are recoverable, the
decision to interpret timely notice provisions as covenants rather than
conditions opens the door in Texas for the recovery of pre-tender
costs.
Applying a prejudice analysis to the scenario described in Section I,
the subcontractor should recover pre-tender defense costs because the
insurer was not prejudiced by the delay. In that scenario, the subcontractor was not aware of its right to a defense, indemnity, or additional
insured status until November 1, 2009.89 At that time, the subcontractor received the contract between the operator and driller, and
promptly tendered its demand for defense, indemnity, and treatment
as an additional insured. 9° In the intervening eight months, the subcontractor paid for its own defense, completed written discovery,
hired experts, and participated in depositions, all while the driller's
insurer benefited from and relied on these defense efforts.
The defense by private counsel accomplished all that a defense by
the insurer would have accomplished because the insurer would have
to complete all of the same tasks as if it had conducted the defense
from the inception of the suit. 91 Consequently, it will be challenging
for the insurer to establish that it was prejudiced by the timing of the
tender. In such a case, the subcontractor should be entitled to all attorney's fees and costs expended from the inception of the suit to the
date of tender. 92
89. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Darter, 361 S.W.2d 254, 255 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1962, no writ).
90. See, e.g., Cent. Sur. & Ins. Corp. v. Anderson, 446 S.W.2d 897, 902 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1969, no writ).
91. See Costagliola v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 560 A.2d 1285, 1289-90 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1988); see also Klein, supra note 3, at 1104 ("Where an insured
defends itself effectively and efficiently in the period prior to notice, the insurer benefits from the insured's efforts-indeed, had it received notice earlier, the insurer may
well have taken the very same measures.").
92. See Peavey Co. v. MN ANPA, 971 F.3d 1168, 1173 (5th Cir. 1992); see also
Klein, supra note 3, at 1104.
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